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Abstract
Scoring systems are an extremely important class of election systems. A length-
m (so-called) scoring vector applies only to m-candidate elections. To handle general
elections, one must use a family of vectors, one per length. The most elegant ap-
proach to making sure such families are “family-like” is the recently introduced notion
of (polynomial-time uniform) pure scoring rules (Betzler and Dorn, 2010), where each
scoring vector is obtained from its precursor by adding one new coefficient. We obtain
the first dichotomy theorem for pure scoring rules for a control problem. In particular,
for constructive control by adding voters (CCAV), we show that CCAV is solvable in
polynomial time for k-approval with k ≤ 3, k-veto with k ≤ 2, every pure scoring rule
in which only the two top-rated candidates gain nonzero scores, and a particular rule
that is a “hybrid” of 1-approval and 1-veto. For all other pure scoring rules, CCAV is
NP-complete. We also investigate the descriptive richness of different models for defin-
ing pure scoring rules, proving how more rule-generation time gives more rules, proving
that rationals give more rules than do the natural numbers, and proving that some
restrictions previously thought to be “w.l.o.g.” in fact do lose generality.
1 Introduction
Elections give rise to a plethora of interesting questions in the social and political sciences,
and have been extensively studied from a computer-science point of view in the last two
∗Supported in part by NSF grants CCF-{0915792,1101452,1101479} and by COST Action IC1205. Work
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decades. We study the control problem, in which the chair of an election (ab)uses her power
to try to affect the election outcome. In this paper we focus on constructive control by
adding voters (CCAV), i.e., where the chair tries to make her favorite candidate win by
adding voters. Constructive control by adding voters is an extremely important control
type, since it occurs in (political) practice very often. A standard example is the “Get-
out-the-Vote” efforts of political parties, aimed at (supposed) supporters of those parties.
However, we should also mention that, as has been pointed out for example in books by
Riker (1986) and Taylor (2005), in modern politics issues of candidate introduction or
removal (CCAC/CCDC) have become highly important; the case of Ralph Nader in two
recent American elections vividly supports this point.
The computational complexity of CCAV and other forms of control was first studied
by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick (1992), for plurality and (so-called) Condorcet elections. In
this paper, we study the complexity of CCAV for pure scoring rules, an attractive class
introduced by Betzler and Dorn (2010) that contains many important voting systems. A
scoring rule for an election with m candidates is defined by m coefficients α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥
αm. Each voter ranks the m candidates from her most favorite to her least favorite; a
candidate gains αi points from being in position i on that voter’s ballot.
Well-known examples of families of scoring rules include the following. Borda Count
for m candidates uses coefficients m − 1,m − 2, . . . , 1, 0. k-approval uses coefficients
1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−k
; k-veto uses 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−k
, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
. Dowdall voting, used for Nauru’s parliament,
uses 1, 12 ,
1
3 , . . . ,
1
m .
The construction of the scoring vector for a specific number of candidates usually follows
a natural pattern, as in the above examples. This leads to the definition of a “pure scoring
rule.” We discuss the notion of “purity” in detail in this paper. (Basically, it means that
at each length we insert one entry into the previous length’s vector; all our above examples
are pure.)
There is a rich literature on computational aspects of scoring rules, e.g., dichotomy
theorems on weighted manipulation (Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra, 2007), the pos-
sible winner problem (Betzler and Dorn, 2010; Baumeister and Rothe, 2012), and bribery
(Faliszewski et al., 2009), as well as results about specific voting systems (Betzler et al.,
2011; Davies et al., 2011; Faliszewski et al., 2013).
In this paper, we provide the first complete investigation of the complexity of the un-
weighted CCAV problem for pure scoring rules. We prove a dichotomy theorem that gives a
complete complexity-theoretic classification of that control problem for pure scoring rules.
Our result is as follows.
It turns out that there are only 4 types of pure scoring rules for which CCAV is solvable
in polynomial time:
1. k-approval for k ≤ 3,
2. k-veto for k ≤ 2,
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3. every pure scoring rule in which only the two top-rated candidates receive a nonzero
score,
4. a particular rule which is a “hybrid” of 1-approval and 1-veto: each voter awards her
favorite candidate 1 point, and her least favorite candidate −1 point.
For every pure scoring rule that is not one of the above election systems, CCAV is NP-
complete. The last rule mentioned above is particularly interesting for two reasons: First,
it was the only one for which the complexity of the possible winner problem was left open
in Betzler and Dorn (2010). Second, it is the only one for which polynomial-time solvability
depends on the actual coefficients, and not only on the <-order of the values: While this
election system is equal to the rule generated by coefficients 2, 1, . . . , 1, 0, the rule generated
by using coefficients 3, 1, . . . , 1, 0 leads to an NP-complete CCAV-problem.
A key point in the proof of any dichotomy theorem is to cover all relevant cases. We
thus base our dichotomy result on a study of the descriptional richness of definitions of
scoring protocols. We examine how variations of key parameters as the abovementioned
purity requirement, the complexity allowed to compute the coefficients, and the universe
from which the coefficients may be chosen affect the set of election systems that can be
represented. Interestingly, we discover that assumptions made previously in the literature,
which were believed to be without loss of generality, in fact restrict the rules that can be
expressed. Taking these results into account, we introduce a flexible purity condition that is
more robust with respect to the abovementioned variations. We show that the new notion
strictly generalizes pure scoring rules with integer scores and coincides with pure scoring
rules with rational coefficients.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we give necessary preliminaries about
the class of election systems that we study. In Section 3, we study the descriptive richness
of definitions of positional scoring rules. Section 4 contains our main complexity result. All
proofs from Section 3 and some technical proofs from Section 4 have been deferred to the
appendix.
2 Preliminaries
As is standard, given an m-component (so-called “scoring”) vector α = (α1, . . . , αm) such
that α1 ≥ . . . ≥ αm, we define a so-called (m-candidate) “scoring system” election based
on this by, for each voter (the voters vote by strict, linear orders over the candidates),
giving αi points to the voter’s ith-most-favorite candidate. Whichever candidate(s) get the
highest number of points, summed over all voters, are the winner(s). We refer to the αis as
“coefficients.”
We will use the following very pure definition of pure scoring rules, which removes some
of the additional assumptions that have been used in earlier work. Indeed, earlier work
asserted that (at least some of) these assumptions were not restrictions; we will look at
that issue anew below.
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An election system E is a T -GSR (generalized scoring rule) if there is a function f that
on each input 0m, m ≥ 1, outputs an m-component scoring vector αm = (αm1 , . . . , α
m
m)
such that αm1 ≥ . . . ≥ α
m
m and each α
i
j belongs to T , and for each m, the winner set
under E is exactly the winner set given by the scoring system using the scoring vector αm.
The notation 0m denotes a string of m “0”s. Using this as the argument ensures that
the generator’s computation time is measured as a function of m, since its input length
is exactly m. Since the votes are of size at least m each, this provides the natural, fair
approach to framing FP-uniformity (as we will do below). We call f a generator for E .
While one can consider election systems based on an f that is not computable, in practice
we want there to be an efficient algorithm computing f . This is expressed with different
uniformity conditions. If E is a T -GSR via some generator f that can be computed in a
complexity class F , then E is an F-uniform-T -GSR and f is an F-uniform T -generator.
The values of T we will be interested in are the naturals N, the nonnegative rationals Q≥0,
the rationals Q, and the integers Z. Our most important value of F will be the polynomial-
time functions, FP. When we do not state “nonuniform” or some specific uniformity, we
always mean FP-uniform. When we put a name in boldface, it indicates all the elections
that can be generated by a generator of the named sort, e.g., FP-uniform-Z-GSR is the
class of all polynomial-time-uniform generalized scoring rules with integer coefficients, a
class first defined and discussed by Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra (2007).
A T -GSR (of whatever uniformity) is a T -PSR (pure scoring rule) if it has a generator
(of the same uniformity) f satisfying the following “purity” constraint: For each m ≥ 2,
there is a component of αm that when deleted leaves exactly the vector αm−1.
Throughout the paper we use the following observation, which notes that two scoring
vectors, after being “normalized,” differ if and only if they are capturing distinct election
systems: An m-position scoring vector α = (α1, . . . , αm) (over N) is normalized if αm = 0
and the greatest common divisor of its nonzero αi’s is 1. Normalizing a given scoring vector
(over N or Z) is easily achievable in polynomial time: subtract αm from each coefficient
and then divide each coefficient by the gcd (computed using Euclid’s gcd algorithm) of the
nonzero thus-altered coefficients. The normalization of a scoring vector over Q (resp., Q≥0)
is done by multiplying through by the lcm of the denominators of the nonzero coefficients,
and then viewing that as a vector over Z (resp., N) and normalizing it as above.
Proposition 2.1. Let m ≥ 1 and let α and α′ be m-position scoring vectors over T ⊆ Q.
Then α and α′ have the same winner sets on each m-candidate election if and only if α and
α′ both have the same normalized version.
The if direction basically follows from Observation 2.2 of Hemaspaandra and Hema-
spaandra (2007), as noted by Betzler and Dorn (2010). The only if follows by giving a
construction that for any two unequal normalized scoring vectors constructs a vote set on
which their winner sets differ. The construction works by “aligning” the vectors by multi-
plying each so that their first coefficients are equal, and then using a padding construction
to ensure that only two candidates are crucial and that the winner sets can be distinguished
by appropriately exploiting the first position at which the aligned vectors differ.
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Generators f1 and f2 are equivalent if they generate the same election system. Due to
Proposition 2.1, this is the case if and only if, for each length m, the normalized scoring
vectors generated by f1 and f2 for m candidates are identical.
3 Descriptive Richness and PSRs
We now examine how amount of time used to generate PSRs, and the universe the PSR’s
coefficients are drawn from, affect the family of election rules that can be obtained. We also
look at whether such a seemingly innocuous and standard assumption as having the last
coefficient always being zero in fact loses generality; we’ll see that it does lose generality,
but in a way that can in part be papered over.
3.1 Generation Time Gives Descriptional Richness
Does more generation time give a richer class of pure scoring rules? A very tight time
hierarchy can be achieved by a legal form of cheating. In particular, consider any (nice) time
class that can for some m ≥ 3 generate a scoring vector over N of the form (α1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−2
, 0)
such that α1 is so big that some other time class cannot generate this scoring vector (for
example, because it simply doesn’t have enough time to write down enough bits to get a
number as large as α1). Our vector is normalized, and by Proposition 2.1 this already is
enough to allow us to argue that the two time classes differ in their winner sets. (This proof
works for GSRs. And it works for PSRs if the “nice”ness of the class allows it to obey purity
while employing the above approach—hardly an onerous requirement.) However, that claim
simply uses the fact that more time can write more bits. A truly fair and far more interesting
separation would show that one can with more time obtain more pure scoring rules in a
way that does not depend on using coefficient lengths that simply cannot be produced by
the weaker time class. In the dream case, all coefficients in fact would simply be 0 or 1,
so there are no long coefficients in play at all. We in fact have achieved such a hierarchy
theorem. Full time constructibility is a standard notion that most natural time functions
satisfy and, as is standard, when we speak of a time function T (m) by convention that is
shorthand for max(m + 1, ⌈T (m)⌉) (Hopcroft and Ullman, 1979). FDTIME[g(·)] denotes
the functions computable in the given amount of deterministic time.
Theorem 3.1. If T2(m) is a fully time-constructible function and lim sup
n→∞
T1(m) log T1(m)
T2(m)
= 0,
then there is an election rule in FDTIME[T2(m)]-uniform-{0, 1}-PSR that is not in
FDTIME[T1(m)]-uniform-Q-GSR.
The log factor here is not surprising; this is the standard overhead it takes for a 2-tape
Turing machine to simulate a multitape TM. What is surprising is that no additional factor
of m is needed. Why might we expect such a factor? (We caution that the rest of this para-
graph is intended mostly for those having familiarity with the diagonalization techniques
used to prove hierarchy theorems.) In the context of a diagonalization construction (which
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is the basic technique used in the proof of Theorem 3.1), one might expect to (all counting
against the overall time T2 limit) at vector-length m have to “recreate” all the shorter vec-
tors used in earlier diagonalizations to ensure that the length-m and length-(m− 1) vectors
are related in a “pure” way. We however sidestep the need for that overhead by a “purity”-
inducing trick: For each odd m our scoring vector will be of the form 1⌊m/2⌋0⌊m/2⌋+1, and at
each even length, we purely extend that to whichever of 1⌊m/2⌋+10⌊m/2⌋+1 or 1⌊m/2⌋0⌊m/2⌋+2
diagonalizes against the T1-time machine that is being diagonalized against (if this is an m
when we have time to so diagonalize). Briefly, we lurch back to fixed, safe way-stations at
every second length, and this removes the need to recompute our own history.
3.2 Coefficient Richness Gives Descriptional Richness
The richness and structure of the coefficient set for PSRs affects how broad a class of
election rules can be captured, as shown by the following result. (Of course, trivially N-
PSR ⊆ Q≥0-PSR ∩ Z-PSR ⊆ Q≥0-PSR ∪ Z-PSR ⊆ Q-PSR.)
Theorem 3.2. Q≥0-PSR 6⊆ nonuniform-Z-PSR, Z-PSR 6⊆ nonuniform-Q≥0-
PSR, and Q-PSR 6⊆ nonuniform-Q≥0-PSR ∪ nonuniform-Z-PSR.
So for example, in pure scoring rules, (polynomial-time uniformly) using positive ratio-
nals cannot be simulated by naturals or integers, even nonuniformly. And in pure scoring
rules, (polynomial-time uniformly) using integers cannot be simulated by naturals or pos-
itive rationals, even nonuniformly. One might think these claims are impossible, and that
by normalizing one can go back and forth, but it is precisely the purity requirement that is
making that sort of manipulation impossible—there is a price to purity, and it is showing
itself here. (The final part of the theorem does not follow automatically from the first two
parts plus the trivial observation before the theorem; just the weaker variant of that part in
which ∪ is replaced with ∩ follows from those.) Note that enlarging the universe does not
necessarily lead to a larger class of election systems: For example, requiring that coefficients
are odd natural numbers gives the same set of election systems as merely requiring them to
be natural numbers.
We mention a more flexible and highly attractive notion of purity that erases the dif-
ferences just discussed. T -FPSRs (flexible pure scoring rules), of whatever uniformity or
nonuniformity, will be defined exactly the same way as T -PSRs were defined, except the
purity condition is changed to: For each m ≥ 2, there is a component of αm whose removal
gives a scoring vector equivalent to αm−1. Due to Proposition 2.1, this means that the
relevant scoring vectors have the same normalization. We call such generators flexible. For
this notion we have for the nonuniform case and the FP-uniform case (and most other nice
cases), the following equality.
Theorem 3.3. N-FPSR = Q-FPSR = Q≥0-FPSR = Z-FPSR = Q-PSR.
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3.3 Having Smallest Coefficient of Zero Loses Generality—Slightly
Betzler and Dorn (2010) in their definition of scoring rules require that at each m, we have
αmm = 0 (let us call this condition norm-0), and comment that this is not a restriction.
We note that there are PSRs that cannot be generated by any pure scoring rule meeting
that constraint. What is at issue here is a bit subtle: At each fixed length, the restriction
is innocuous. But in the context of families that are bound by the purity constraint, the
restriction loses generality. On the other hand, we will also note that each pure scoring rule
has a generator that is “close” to meeting that constraint—it meets it at all but finitely
many lengths.
Betzler and Dorn (2010) also have a “gcd is 1” condition (although the phrasing is not
crystal clear as to whether the gcd constraint applies to the union of all nonzero coefficients
that occur over all lengths, or whether it must in fact apply separately at each length; the
latter (which we call norm-gcd) would block the vector (2, 0) but the former would not if
the next step were, for example, (3, 2, 0)). However, the gcd issues also can be made to go
away “almost everywhere.” In particular, we have established the following.
Theorem 3.4. There is an FP-uniform PSR that is not generated even by any nonuniform
PSRnorm-0 generator. On the other hand, every FP-uniform (respectively, nonuniform) PSR
is generated by a FP-uniform (respectively, nonuniform) PSR generator that for all but a
finite number of m has the property that the last coefficient, αm,m, is zero and the gcd of
the nonzero coefficients in the length-m vector is one.
Does the second sentence of the theorem imply that each PSR has all its vectors the
same at each length (except for a finite number of exceptional lengths) as the vectors of
some PSR that satisfies norm-0 and norm-gcd? The answer is actually “no.” The somewhat
subtle issue at play is that PSRs can generate vectors that no generator satisfying norm-0
and norm-gcd can ever generate, such as the family (3, 2, . . . , 2, 0). So one should not
from our above theorem claim that it follows from the main dichotomy theorem of Betzler
and Dorn (2010), as completed by Baumeister and Rothe (2012), that we can read off
the complexity (of the possible winner problem) even in our slightly more flexible case.
However, our above theorem does—in light of the actual proof case decomposition used in
those papers (which is based on issues such as whether one has an unbounded number of
positions that differ and so on) and some additional argumentation to connect to that and
in particular to note that Betzler and Dorn (and Baumeister and Rothe) are in effect quietly
covering well even those cases that do not satisfy gcd constraints—connect so well to their
work that each of our cases is settled by their proofs.
4 A Control Dichotomy for PSRs
We study the following problem for an election system E : When R is a set of registered
voters, is there some subset of the unregistered voters U of size at most k that we can add
to the election to ensure that p is the winner?
7
Definition 4.1. Let E be an election system. The constructive control problem for E by
adding voters, E-CCAV, is the following problem: Given two multisets sets of votes R and
U , a candidate p and a number k, is there a set A ⊆ U with ‖A‖ ≤ k such that p is a
winner of the election if the votes in the multiset R ∪A are evaluated using the system E?
We often use a generator, f , as a shorthand for the election system (scoring rule family)
it generates, e.g., we write f -CCAV. For a generator f , we use αf,m = (αf,m1 , . . . , α
f,m
m ) to
denote the scoring vector generated by f for m candidates and its individual coefficients.
To simplify presentation, we only consider FP-uniform generators. However our results
continue to hold as long as we can solve the following question in polynomial time: Given
m, i, and j in unary, does αmi > α
m
j hold, where f(m) = (α
m
1 , . . . , α
m
m)?
Our main result is a complexity dichotomy for f -CCAV when f is an FP-uniform pureQ-
generator (or, equivalently due to Theorem 3.3, a FP-uniform flexible N-generator). Recall
that equivalent generators result in the same election system, hence, due to Proposition 2.1,
Theorem 4.2 implies polynomial-time results for all generators with the same normalization
as one below. We state our main result.
Theorem 4.2. Let f be a FP-uniform pure Q-generator. Then f -CCAV is solvable in
polynomial time if f is equivalent to one of the following generators:
• f1 = (1, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) (this generates 3-approval),
• f2 = (1, . . . , 1, 0) or f3 = (1, . . . , 1, 0, 0) (1/2-veto),
• for some α ≥ β, f4 = (α, β, 0, . . . , 0),
• f5 = (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0).
In all other cases, f -CCAV is NP-complete.
Note that 1- and 2-approval are covered by the generator f4. The remainder of the paper
contains the proof of Theorem 4.2: Section 4.1 contains the algorithms for all polynomial-
time solvable cases, Section 4.2 contains our hardness results (with some proofs deferred to
the appendix), and the proof of Theorem 4.2 follows in Section 4.3.
4.1 Polynomial-Time Results
The following result is proven by Lin (2012).
Theorem 4.3. E-CCAV is solvable in polynomial time if E is k-approval with k ≤ 3 or
k-veto with k ≤ 2.
Due to Proposition 2.1, Theorem 4.3 implies that CCAV remains polynomial-time solv-
able for “scaled” versions of k-approval with k ≤ 3 or k-veto with k ≤ 2, i.e., generators
of the form (α, β, γ, δ, . . . , δ) with β, γ ∈ {α, δ} or (α, . . . , α, β, γ) with β ∈ {α, γ}. We now
look at a generalization of 2-approval: Voters approve of 2 candidates, and can distinguish
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between their first and second choice. CCAV for this generalization remains efficiently
solvable. In contrast, Theorem 4.11 shows that our control problem for the corresponding
generalization of 3-approval is NP-hard.
Theorem 4.4. Let α ≥ β be fixed. Then f -CCAV is polynomial-time solvable for f =
(α, β, 0, . . . , 0).
Proof. Due to Theorem 4.3, assume α > β. Let ℓ be such that ℓ(α − β) ≥ β. Let an
instance with candidates C, favorite candidate p, registered voters R, and potential voters
U be given; let k be the number of voters that can be added. Assume ℓ ≤ k, otherwise brute-
force. Let V1 (V2) be the set of voters in U that put p in the first (second) spot. Clearly, we
add voters only from V1 ∪ V2. Assume w.l.o.g. that two voters who vote identically in the
first two positions also rank the remaining candidates identically. In particular, two voters
in V1 (V2) are different if and only if they vote different candidates in the second (first)
place. We use the following facts.
Fact 1. For i ∈ {1, 2}, given a set S ⊆ V1∪V2, it can be checked in polynomial time whether
S can be extended, by adding at most k − ‖S‖ voters from Vi to make p win.
Fact 2. To make p win, it is never better to add ℓ voters from V2 than adding ℓ pairwise
different voters from V1.
Due to Fact 2, we do not have to consider solutions that use ℓ or more voters from V2
and leave ℓ or more distinct voters from V1 unused. So if a solution exists, we can find one
using fewer than ℓ voters from V2, or leaving fewer than ℓ pairwise different voters from V1
unused. For both cases we will test whether there is a corresponding solution.
We start with the first case. Since ℓ is constant, we can test every subset S ⊆ V2 with
‖S‖ < ℓ. For each of these S, we use Fact 1 to check in polynomial time whether S can be
extended to a solution by adding voters only from V1.
For the second case, we determine in polynomial time whether there is a solution that
does not leave ℓ pairwise different voters from V1 unused as follows: We encode the choice
of the unused voters from V1 as a function u : C → {0, . . . , ‖V1‖} that states, for each
candidate c, the number of unused V1-voters placing c second. Since we look for solutions
satisfying the second case, we only consider functions u for which u(c) > 0 for at most ℓ− 1
candidates.
Thus we can brute-force over all of these possibilities as follows:
1. In the outer loop, we test every subset S ⊆ C with ‖S‖ ≤ ℓ − 1. Since ℓ is a constant,
there are only polynomially many of these sets.
2. For each such S, we test all functions u as above for which u(c) > 0 holds iff c ∈ S. Such
a function can be regarded as a function u : S → {1, . . . , ‖V1‖}. There are ‖V1‖
‖S‖ ≤
‖V1‖
ℓ−1 many of these functions. Since ‖V1‖ is bound by the input size and ℓ is a
constant, this number is polynomial in the input size.
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So we can polynomially go through all possibilities of potentially unused V1-voters, which
is the same as going through all possible sets S′ of used V1-voters. For each of these sets S
′,
we again use Fact 1 to check in polynomial time whether S′ can be extended to a solution.
This completes the proof.
Our final polynomial-time case is the generator (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0). Here every voter “ap-
proves” one candidate and “vetoes” another. This case is interesting for two reasons. First,
it is the only case where the algorithm depends on the coefficients itself, as opposed to their
>-order. Namely, for all α > β > 0 with α 6= 2β, f -CCAV with f = (α, β, . . . , β, 0) is
NP-complete (Theorem 4.12.2). Second, this case was the only one left open in Betzler and
Dorn’s (2010) possible winner dichotomy; the question was eventually settled by Baumeister
and Rothe (2012), who proved NP-completeness.
Theorem 4.5. f -CCAV is solvable in polynomial time for the generator f = (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0).
Proof. Let C, R, and U be the set of candidates, registered voters, and unregistered voters,
p the preferred candidate, and k the number of voters we can add. We add no voter voting
p last, and it is never better to add a voter voting p second than to add one voting p first.
So we first add all voters from U that place p in the first position. If there are more than
k of these voters, we choose the ones to add with the obvious greedy strategy that always
picks, among all available votes of the form p > · · · > c, the one where c currently has
the highest score. After this preprocessing, all relevant voters in U vote c1 > · · · > c2
with p /∈ {c1, c2}. To simplify presentation, we use Proposition 2.1 and consider f as the
generator (1, 0, . . . , 0,−1). Then the score of p is determined by the votes in R.
We reduce the problem to min-cost (network) flow, which can be solved in polynomial
time. Let S =
∑
c∈C−{p} score(c). We use the following nodes and edges:
• For each c ∈ C − {p}, there is a node c, additionally, there are source and target nodes
s and t.
• There is an edge from candidate c1 to candidate c2 with cost 1 and with capacity equal
to the number of voters in U voting c2 > · · · > c1.
• For each candidate-node c, there is an edge from s to c with cost 0 and capacity score(c)
and an edge from c to t with cost 0 and capacity score(p).
Now p can be made winner with at most k additional voters if and only if there is
a flow from s to t with value S and cost at most k: Clearly, network flows with cost at
most k correspond to subsets of U with size at most k, and using an edge (c1, c2) r times
corresponds to adding r voters voting c2 > · · · > c1, since this vote transfers one point from
c1 to c2. The capacity of the outgoing edges of s ensure that each candidate initially gets
the correct number of points (since S points must be distributed), the edges to t ensure
that in the end, no candidate may have more points than p.
The above results cover all polynomial-time cases of Theorem 4.2. We now turn to the
NP-complete cases.
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4.2 Hardness Results
We use the standard NP-complete problem 3DM (3-dimensional matching).
Definition 4.6. 3DM is defined as follows:
Input Pairwise disjoint sets X, Y , and Z with ‖X‖ = ‖Y ‖ = ‖Z‖, and a set M ⊆
X × Y × Z.
Question Is there a set C ⊆M with ‖C‖ = ‖X‖ that covers X, Y , and Z?
We say that C covers X (resp., Y , Z) if every element from X (resp., Y , Z) appears in a
tuple of C. SinceX, Y , and Z are pairwise disjoint, in this case every element fromX (Y , Z)
appears in the first (second, third) component of a tuple from C. Since ‖X‖ = ‖Y ‖ = ‖Z‖,
a set C ⊆ M with ‖C‖ = ‖X‖ covers X (Y , Z) if and only if no two tuples from C agree
in the first (second, third) component. A set C covering X, Y , and Z is called a cover.
4.2.1 Constructing Elections
In our hardness proofs, we often need to set up the registered voters to ensure specific scores
for the candidates. The following lemma shows that, if there is a “dummy” candidate to
whom any surplus points can be “shifted,” we can obtain every set of relative scores that
can be expressed as a polynomial-size linear combination of the coefficients in the scoring
vector.
Lemma 4.7. Given a scoring vector (α1, . . . , αm), and for each c ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1}, numbers
ac1, . . . , a
c
m in signed unary, and a number k in unary, we can compute, in polynomial
time, votes such that the scores of the candidates when evaluating these votes according
to the scoring vector (α1, . . . , αm) are as follows: There is some o such that for each c ∈
{1, . . . ,m− 1}, score(c) = o+
∑m
i=1 a
c
iαi, and score(c) > score(m) + kα1.
The value o in Lemma 4.7 is the common offset for all relevant scores. The actual value
of o is irrelevant, since the winner of the election is determined by the relative scores. The
value k is given so that the computed votes ensure that the dummy candidate m cannot
win the election with the addition of at most k voters.
4.2.2 “Many” Different Coefficients
We now show that the CCAV-problem is NP-complete for generators using “many” different
coefficients. Consider any generator f using (at least) 7 different coefficients for some
length m. Then with αf,m = (αf,m1 , α
f,m
2 , α
f,m
3 , α
f,m
4 , . . . , α
f,m
m−2, α
f,m
m−1, α
f,m
m ) we know that
αf,m4 > α
f,m
m−2. This condition in fact suffices for the CCAV problem to be NP-hard; the
result applies to, e.g., Borda, 3-veto, and 4-approval (the latter two use just two different
coefficients, but satisfy αf,m4 > α
f,m
m−2 for m ≥ 7).
For 4-approval or 3-veto, NP-hardness can be proven by positioning the elements of M
from a 3DM-instance, along with p, in the 4 top positions of an unregistered 4-approval vote
or (without p) in the last 3 positions of an unregistered 3-veto vote. In our cases, we can
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always “simulate” one of these systems: If αf,m4 > α
f,m
m−2, then being ranked in one of the
first 4 positions is strictly better than being ranked in one of the last 3 positions. Roughly
speaking, if “many” intermediate coefficients are larger than the last 3, then the last 3 are
the “exception,” and we can use them to “simulate” 3-veto. On the other hand, if “many”
intermediate coefficients are smaller than the first 4, then the first 4 are the “exception”
and we “simulate” 4-approval.1 NP-hardness for both 3-veto and 4-approval is proved by
Lin (2012); however we use a direct reduction from 3DM in our generalization.
We start with the “simulation” of 3-veto. The statement of the following result is a bit
unusual. It indeed gives a reduction for generators meeting the condition αf,m3k+1 > α
f,m
m−2 for
all m. But beyond that the function g gives what we call a “partial” reduction from 3DM
to f -CCAV for f ’s that meet the condition for some values of m. In the proof, the size of
the 3DM instance is artificially enlarged to ensure that this “partial reduction” meets an
analogue counterpart in such a way that for every generator f that satisfies αf,m4 > α
f,m
m−2 for
some m, we know that for each large enough m, one of the two reductions can be applied.
(Appendix Section B.3 has more on this.)
Theorem 4.8. Let f be an FP-uniform Q-generator. Then there exists an FP-computable
function g such that
• g takes as input an instance I3DM of 3DM and produces an instance ICCAV of f -CCAV
with m = 6k candidates, where k = ‖X‖ = ‖Y ‖ = ‖Z‖.
• If αf,m3k+1 > α
f,m
m−2, then: I3DM is a positive instance of 3DM iff ICCAV is a positive instance
of f -CCAV.
Proof. We write αi for α
f,m
i . W.l.o.g., let X = {s1, . . . , sk}, Y = {sk+1, . . . , s2k}, and
Z = {s2k+1, . . . , s3k}. We use the following candidates:
• Each si ∈ {s1, . . . , s3k} is a candidate.
• p is the preferred candidate.
• There are dummy candidates d1, . . . , dm−3k−1. We assume there are at least 3 dummy
candidates, i.e., k ≥ 2.
We now use Lemma 4.7 to construct the set R of registered voters such that the scores of
the candidates are as follows. (In the following, we “normalize” the scores of all candidates
using the score of p as a base. So we pretend that the number o from the application of
Lemma 4.7 is zero in order to simplify the presentation, clearly the absolute points of all
candidates must be positive and are shifted by the actual number o from the lemma.)
• score(p) = 0.
1For generators where both cases apply such as f = (2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, . . . , 1, 0, 0, 0), either reduction works.
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• score(si) = kα1 − (k − 1)α1+i − αm−r(i), where r(i) = 2, 1, 0 depending on whether
si ∈ X,Y,Z, respectively. (So αm−r(i) is exactly the amount of points that si gains from
a vote that “vetoes” si, see below)
• score(di) < −kα1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , dm−3k−1}.
Let M ⊆ X × Y × Z be the set from I3DM. For each (x, y, z) = (sh, si, sj) ∈ M (so
clearly h < i < j), we add an available voter to U voting as follows:
p > s1 > · · · > sh−1 > d1 > sh+1 > · · · > si−1 >
d2 > si+1 > · · · > sj−1 > d3 > sj+1 > · · · > s3k >
d4 > · · · > dm−3k−1 > x > y > z.
We say that such a vote vetoes the candidates x, y, and z, and identify elements of M
and the corresponding votes.
We show that the reduction is correct. First assume that the instance of 3DM is positive,
and let C ⊆M be the cover with ‖C‖ = k. We add the voters corresponding to the elements
of C in the obvious way and show that p indeed wins the resulting election.
To see this, it suffices to show that p has at least as many points as each candidate si,
since by construction, the dummy candidates cannot win the election with adding at most
k votes. So let i ∈ {1, . . . , 3k}. The final score for p and si are as follows:
• p gains α1 points in each of the k additional votes, so p ends up with exactly kα1 points.
• si gains (k− 1)α1+i points from the (k− 1) votes corresponding to elements (x, y, z) ∈ C
with si /∈ {x, y, z}, and αm−r(i) points from the single vote vetoing si. So si ends up with
a final score of kα1 − (k − 1)α1+i − αm−r(i) + (k − 1)α1+i + αm−r(i) = kα1 as well.
For the converse, let C ⊆ M be a set of at most k votes whose addition lets p win. If
this is not a cover, then there is some si that is vetoed in none of the added votes. We now
compare the points of p and si.
• p gains α1 points in each of the ‖C‖ additional votes, so p ends up with exactly ‖C‖α1
points.
• Since si is not vetoed in any new vote, si gains α1+i points in each added vote and thus
ends up with kα1 − (k − 1)α1+i − αm−r(i) + ‖C‖α1+i points.
Since ‖C‖ ≤ k, α1 ≥ αi+1 and αi+1 ≥ α3k+1 > αm−2 ≥ αm−r(i), it follows that kα1 − (k −
1)α1+i − αm−r(i) + ‖C‖α1+i − ‖C‖α1
= (k − ‖C‖)(α1 − α1+i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+α1+i − αm−r(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0. So si beats p if C is not a cover; since by
assumption adding C makes p win, C must be a cover.
In a similar way, we can prove an analogous result for all scoring rules that “can im-
plement” 4-approval in the sense that being voted in one of the first 4 positions is strictly
better than being voted in most “later” positions. The proof of the following result is very
similar to the proof of Theorem 4.8, except that an additional argument is needed to ensure
that the favorite candidate cannot be made a winner with less than k additional voters.
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Theorem 4.9. Theorem 4.8 also holds when the condition αf,mk+1 > α
f,m
m−2 is replaced with
αf,m4 > α
f,m
m−3k+1.
As mentioned above, we now put the two reductions above together to obtain the NP-
hardness result of this section, i.e., to prove that f -CCAV is NP-complete as soon as there
is a number m where the coefficients of f satisfy αf,m4 > α
f,m
n−2. If this condition is true, then
we know that one of the inequalities αf,m4 ≥ α
f,m
5 ≥ · · · ≥ α
f,m
m−3 ≥ α
f,m
m−2 is in fact strict.
Depending on the position of this strict inequality, we choose which reduction to apply: If
the strict inequality appears “close” to the first candidate, then the first “few” positions are
strictly better than “most,” and the system can “simulate” k-approval for some k ≥ 4. On
the other hand, if the strict inequality appears “close” to the last candidate, then the last
“few” positions are worse than “most,” and we can similarly “simulate” k-veto for some
k ≥ 3.
Theorem 4.10. f -CCAV is NP-complete for every FP-uniform pure Q-generator f with
αf,m4 > α
f,m
m−2 for some m.
4.2.3 “Few” Different Coefficients
We now study pure generators f not covered by Theorem 4.10, i.e., where αf,m4 ≤ α
f,m
m−2 for
all m. Then for m ≥ 6, αf,m is of the form (αf,m1 , α
f,m
2 , α
f,m
3 , α
f,m
4 , . . . , α
f,m
4 , α
f,m
5 , α
f,m
6 ).
The reductions above cannot work in this case, since there are no 3 positions “worse than
most” and no 4 positions “better than most.”
Due to Theorem 3.3, we can regard f equivalently as flexible N-generators or as pure
Q-generators. For the latter representation, purity requires that all coefficients from αf,m
also appear in αf,m+1. So the above numbers α1, . . . , α6 do not depend on m. We can use
a fixed affine transformation for these finitely many coefficients and, using Proposition 2.1,
rewrite all coefficients as natural numbers.
Our next hardness result concerns a generalization of 3-approval. Recall from
Theorem 4.3 that CCAV for 3-approval itself, i.e., the generator (α,α, α, 0, . . . , 0), is solvable
in polynomial time. In Theorem 4.4, we proved a generalization of 2-approval to still give a
polynomial-time solvable CCAV-problem. We now show that the analogous generalization
of 3-approval leads to NP-completeness.
Theorem 4.11. Let α ≥ β ≥ γ > 0 and α 6= γ. Let f be the generator giving
(α, β, γ, 0, . . . , 0). Then f -CCAV is NP-complete.
Proof. Let M be the set from an instance of 3DM with ‖M‖ = n, and let k = ‖X‖ =
‖Y ‖ = ‖Z‖ (recall X, Y , and Z must be pairwise disjoint). We use the candidates X ∪
Y ∪Z ∪ {p} ∪ {Si, S
′
i | Si ∈M} and a dummy candidate d to be able to apply Lemma 4.7.
We use the lemma to set up the registered votes such that the resulting relative scores
are as follows: score(p) = α + 2γ, score(c) = (n + 2k)β + 2γ for all c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z,
score(Si) = (n + 2k)β + min(α, 2γ), and score(S
′
i) = (n + 2k)β + α + γ for each Si ∈ M .
Further, score(d) < −(n + 2k)α1. For each Si = (x, y, z), we introduce four unregistered
voters voting as follows:
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x > p > Si > . . . .
y > p > Si > . . . .
z > p > S′i > . . . .
Si > p > S
′
i > . . . .
We show that p can be made a winner of the election by adding at most n + 2k voters
if and only if the 3DM-instance is positive, i.e., there is a set C ⊆M with ‖C‖ = k and for
Si 6= Sj ∈ C, Si and Sj differ in all three components.
First assume that there is such a cover. In this case, p can be made a winner of the
election by adding the following voters: For each Si = (x, y, z) ∈ C, we add the votes
x > p > Si, y > p > Si, and z > p > S
′
i. For each Si = (x, y, z) /∈ I, we add the vote
Si > p > S
′
i. Note that this adds exactly 3k + (n − k) = n+ 2k votes. Adding these votes
results in the following scores:
• p gains β points in each added vote, so p gains (n + 2k)β points and p’s final score is
α+ 2γ + (n+ 2k)β,
• each candidate in X ∪Y ∪Z gains α points, leading to a final score of α+(n+ 2k)β + 2γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
previous score
as well,
• for each Si ∈ C, we have that score(Si) = (n+ 2k)β +min(α, 2γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
previous score
+2γ ≤ (n+2k)β+α+
2γ, which again is the score of p.
• for each Si /∈ C, we have score(Si) = (n + 2k)β +min(α, 2γ) + α ≤ (n+ 2k)β + 2γ + α,
equal to the score of p.
• for each S′i (independent of whether S
′
i ∈ C or S
′
i /∈ C), we have score(S
′
i) =
(n+ 2k)β + α+ γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
previous score
+γ = (n+ 2k)β + α+ 2γ, again this is the score of p.
Thus all candidates tie and so in particular, p is a winner of the election.
For the converse, assume that p can be made a winner by adding at most n+2k voters.
Since each S′i initially beats p, at least one vote is added. Thus there is a candidate c ∈
X∪Y ∪Z with score(c) ≥ (n+2k)β+2γ+α, or some S′i with score(S
′
i) ≥ (n+2k)β+α+2γ. In
both cases, we need to add at least n+2k voters to ensure that p has at least α+2γ+(n+2k)β
points as well.
Since n + 2k votes are added, and each of these votes gives points to p and 2 other
candidates, there are 2n + 4k positions awarding points in the added votes that are filled
with (not necessarily different) candidates other than p. Each of the 3k candidates from
X ∪ Y ∪ Z can only gain α points without beating p in the election, so each of these can
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fill at most one of these 2n + 4k positions. So at least 2n + k positions must be filled by
(again, not necessarily different) candidates from {Si, S
′
i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Each S
′
i can appear
at most once in the third position without beating p. Since there are n candidates of the
form S′i, it follows that there must be n + k occurrences of candidates Si in the first three
positions of the added votes. Since no Si can gain α+ γ points without beating p,
2 each Si
can either appear in a vote Si > p > S
′
i, or in up to two votes of the form c > p > Si with
c ∈ X ∪ Y . (Si = (x, y, z) cannot appear in three of these, since then one of x and y would
gain too many points.) So the only way to fill n+ k positions with candidates of the form
Si is having 2k occurrences of Si in the third place, and n− k occurrences of Si in the first
place. In order to fill all positions, each S′i has to appear once in the final position, and due
to the above, n− k of these occurrences are in a vote of the form Si > p > S
′
i. Thus there
are k votes of the form z > p > S′i. It follows that there are 3k votes added that vote a
candidate from X ∪ Y ∪ Z in the first position, and n− k voters are added that vote some
Si first. Since no Si may appear both in first and in last position, and each S
′
i may appear
only once, and each xi, yi, and zi may gain only α points, it follows that the added votes
correspond to a cover.
We also have proved the following cases NP-complete.
Theorem 4.12. The problem f -CCAV is NP-complete if f is one of the following pure
generators:
1. f = (α1, α2, α3, α4, . . . , α4, α5, 0) with α2 > α4 > 0.
2. f = (α1, α2, . . . , α2, 0) with α1 /∈ {α2, 2α2}, α2 > 0.
3. f = (α1, α2, . . . , α2, α5, 0) with α1 > α2 > α5.
4. f = (α1, . . . , α1, α5, 0) with α1 > α5 > 0.
4.3 Proof of Dichotomy Theorem
We now use the individual results from Sections 4.1 and 4.2 to prove our main dichotomy
result, Theorem 4.2:
Proof. The polynomial cases follow from Theorems 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, we prove hardness.
If αf,m4 > α
f,m
m−2 for some m, hardness follows from Theorem 4.10. So assume α
f,m
4 =
· · · = αf,mm−2 for all m ≥ 6. As argued in the discussion after Theorem 4.10, we assume
αm,f = (α1, α2, α3, α4, . . . , α4, α5, α6) for each m ≥ 6. Due to Proposition 2.1, we can
assume α6 = 0. We reduce the number of relevant coefficients from 5 to 3:
• If α4 = 0, then, since f does not generate 3-approval and is not equivalent to f4, α1 >
α3 > 0. Hardness follows from Theorem 4.11.
2To see this, we compute the difference between the score of Si after gaining α+ γ points and that of p
after gaining (n+2k)β points. This value is (n+2k)β+min(α, 2γ)+α+γ−α−γ−(n+2k)β = min(α, 2γ)−γ.
Since α > γ and γ > 0, this value is strictly positive, so Si indeed beats p if Si gains α+ γ points.
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• If α2 > α4 > 0, hardness follows from Theorem 4.12.1.
So assume α2 = α3 = α4 > 0, i.e., f is of the form (α1, α2, . . . , α2, α5, 0). We make a further
case distinction:
• If α2 = α5, then since f does not generate 1-veto, we know that α1 6= α5 = α2. Since
f is not equivalent to (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0), we know that α1 6= 2α2. Thus NP-hardness follows
from Theorem 4.12.2.
• If α2 > α5, then depending on whether α1 > α2 > α5 or α1 = α2 > α5, hardness
follows from Theorem 4.12.3 or Theorem 4.12.4 (note that in the latter case, we know
that α5 6= 0, since f does not generate 2-veto).
Acknowledgments We thank the AAAI 2014 reviewers for helpful comments and sug-
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Appendix
The appendix is structured as follows:
• In Section A, we provide additional discussion and full proofs for the results on descrip-
tional richness and pure scoring rules contained in Sections 2 and 3 of this paper.
• Section B contains the proofs that were omitted from Section 4, i.e., the dichotomy result,
and also provides additional discussion of “partial reductions.”
A Omitted Proofs and Discussion from Sections 2 and 3
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proposition 2.1. Let m ≥ 1 and let α and α′ be m-position scoring vectors over T ⊆ Q.
Then α and α′ have the same winner sets on each m-candidate election if and only if α and
α′ both have the same normalized version.
Proof. The “if” direction follows from Observation 2.2 of Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaan-
dra (2007), as noted in Betzler and Dorn (2010).
Let us prove the “only if” direction. This result seems so natural and important that
it feels as if it should be a folk theorem, although we don’t know of it as such; but in any
case, since the result is crucial to this paper, we include a construction that clearly and
explicitly establishes this claim. Let D and D′ be arbitrary, fixed length-m scoring vectors
over N such that their normalizations, A and A′, differ. We will construct an m-candidate
election in which the winner sets under A and A′ differ.
Since by the “if” direction of the present proposition A and D always yield the same
winner set, and also by the “if” direction of the present proposition A′ and D′ always yield
the same winner set, we may conclude that our constructed election has different winner
sets under D and D′.
Let the components of the normalized scoring vector A be (α1, α2, . . . , 0), and let the
components of the normalized scoring vector A′ be (α′1, α
′
2, . . . , 0).
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If m = 1, A 6= A′ is impossible. If m = 2, A 6= A′ exactly if one of them is (0, 0) and
one is (1, 0), and these easily can be seen to give different winners on some inputs. Thus
we from now on in this proof assume that m ≥ 3.
A scoring vector is trivial if all its coefficients are the same, e.g., (0, 0, 0). If A and A′
are both trivial, then A = A′, and if exactly one is trivial then building an input separating
them is easy. Thus we from now on in this proof assume that both A and A′ are nontrivial.
Recall that both A and A′ are normalized. We will in polynomial time “align” them, i.e.,
we will scale them so that the first components of A and A′ become identical. In particular,
to align them we will multiply A by α′1 and we will multiply A
′ by α1. So the first coefficient
of each will now be α1α
′
1. Let us rename the thus-scaled vectors (each equivalent to its
original vector as to what winner sets it gives, due to Observation 2.2 of Hemaspaandra
and Hemaspaandra (2007)) as B = (β1, β2, . . . , βm−1, 0) and B
′ = (β′1, β
′
2, . . . , β
′
m−1, 0).
Let γ be the least i such that βi 6= β
′
i. W.l.o.g., assume βi > β
′
i. γ = 1 is impossible
since β1 = β
′
1 = α1α
′
1. So 2 ≤ i ≤ m− 1.
We will now specify an election in which B and B′ have different winner sets.
Our candidates will be a, b, and “dummy” candidates d1, . . . , dm−2. We will ensure that
only a and b are serious contenders for winning.
Let s1 be a shorthand for “d1 > d2 > · · · > dm−2,” let s2 be a shorthand for “d2 > d3 >
· · · > dm−2 > d1,” and so on, up to sm−2 being a shorthand for “dm−2 > d1 > · · · > dm−3.”
Our vote set is as follows:
1. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 2, we will have H votes “a > b > si” and we will have H votes
“b > a > si.” H’s exact value will be specified later in the proof, but will be chosen to
be so large that a and b are the only serious contenders.
2. βγ votes of the form “a is the top choice and b is the last choice (and the other choices will
be irrelevant to our proofs, but for specificity let us say they are filled in in lexicographical
order).”
3. β1 votes of the form “b is the γth choice and a is the last choice (and the other choices will
be irrelevant to our proofs, but for specificity let us say they are filled in in lexicographical
order).”
That ends our specification of the votes.
Let us tally up the points that each candidate gets under B and under B′. Clearly,
and keeping in mind that β1 = β
′
1, we have: scoreB(a) = (m − 2)H(β1 + β2) + β1βγ + 0,
scoreB′(a) = (m − 2)H(β
′
1 + β
′
2) + βγβ
′
1 + 0, scoreB(b) = (m − 2)H(β1 + β2) + β1βγ + 0,
scoreB′(b) = (m − 2)H(β
′
1 + β
′
2) + β1β
′
γ + 0, scoreB(di) ≤ (m − 3)(2β3) + βγβ2 + (β1)
2,
and scoreB′(di) ≤ (m − 3)(2β
′
3) + βγβ
′
2 + β1β
′
1. We now set the value of H, namely to
be H = 2β1. Keeping in mind that β1 = β
′
1 ≥ 1, it is easy to see that this choice of
H ensures that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 2, min(scoreB(a), scoreB(b)) > scoreB(di) and
min(scoreB′(a), scoreB′(b)) > scoreB′(di). So we have ensured that, under B and under B
′,
a and b have more points than any di.
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Under B′, note that a is the one and only winner (recall β1 = β
′
1 and βγ > β
′
γ). But our
votes ensure that under B, a and b tie as the (sole) winners.
So the votes we gave show that B and B′ (and thus D and D′) have different winner
sets on some example, namely, the above example.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Theorem 3.1. If T2(m) is a fully time-constructible function and lim sup
n→∞
T1(m) log T1(m)
T2(m)
= 0,
then there is an election rule in FDTIME[T2(m)]-uniform-{0, 1}-PSR that is not in
FDTIME[T1(m)]-uniform-Q-GSR.
Proof. Rather than proving Theorem 3.1, we will prove a slightly weaker result,
“Theorem X,” and then will explain how to modify that proof to establish Theorem 3.1.
Theorem X There is an integer constant k > 0 such that if T2(m) is a fully
time-constructible function, and lim sup
n→∞
T1(m) logT1(m)
T2(m)
= 0, and (∀m)[T2(m) ≥
k(m+1)], then there is an election rule in FDTIME[T2(m)]-uniform-{0, 1}-
PSR that is not in FDTIME[T1(m)]-uniform-Z-GSR.
We will prove Theorem X by describing how to appropriately adjust the classic presenta-
tion by Hopcroft and Ullman (1979), henceforward “HU,” of the proof of the deterministic
time hierarchy theorem (their Theorem 12.9); that proof of HU can be found as pages
297–298 of that book, and that proof itself draws also on the framework of that book’s
earlier proof of the deterministic space hierarchy theorem. We will assume that the reader
is familiar with those deep, classic proof presentations; anyone not expert in complexity will
want to either first master that proof framework or just skip the present proof.
So, suppose we are given T1 and T2 satisfying the conditions of Theorem X. We’ll later
specify k, but k must not and will not depend on T1 or T2.
Our goal is to show that there is an FDTIME[T2(m)]-uniform-{0, 1}-PSR generator, call
it f , whose rule’s winner set is not obtained by any FDTIME[T1(m)]-uniform-Z-GSR.
Generally, we just follow the overall architecture of the HU proof, but the differences
are as follows. First, we will be computing and diagonalizing against functions. So our
enumeration of machines will be an enumeration of all function-computing Turing machines
(i.e., machines with an output tape such that when they halt, whatever is on the output
tape is viewed as being the output). Like HU, we will assume that our enumeration of
such machines has the property that if w encodes a machine, then 1kw encodes exactly the
same machine; “padding” by adding 1∗ as a prefix to a machine’s coding does not change
the machine encoded. (Unlike HU, who truly need this due to their making a liminf claim,
we merely need each machine to appear infinitely often in the enumeration, since for other
reasons we are simply making a limsup claim. However, this padding property certainly is
a fine way of achieving what we need.)
Another difference is that we need to be a pure scoring rule. So each length rule must
appropriately link to and extend the rule from the previous length. As mentioned in the
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text immediately after Theorem 3.1, doing so in the obvious fashion would seem to add
a multiplicative factor of m, but instead we use the trick mentioned there to avoid this.
That is, for each odd natural number m, f(0m) will be 1⌊m/2⌋0⌊m/2⌋+1 (e.g., (0), (1, 0, 0),
(1, 1, 0, 0, 0), etc.). This is purely mechanical, and does not involve any diagonalizing. (One
might worry that for some very small values of m we might not even have time to realize
that m was odd and write the appropriate output; that worry is because one might worry
that for some small m we may not have time greater than m + 1 and that is not enough
time to both see what m is, and that it is odd, and to already just before halfway through
it have known that we are just before halfway through it and to have switched what we are
outputting from 1s to 0s. However, the (∀m)[T2(m) ≥ k(m+1)] assumption of Theorem X
will ensures us that we do have that time.)
Now, at each even length m, we’ll try to do a diagonalization, if we have time. Our
framework is that we will always have as our vector at this length either 1⌊m/2⌋+10⌊m/2⌋+1
or 1⌊m/2⌋0⌊m/2⌋+2 (e.g., at length 4, either 1100 or 1000; note that in this proof we will
quietly go back and forth notationally between, for example, (1, 1, 0, 0) and 1100 and 1202).
Basically, we want to ensure that if whatever FDTIME[T1(m)]-uniform-Z-GSR generator
we (“we” are the function f) at stage m are trying to diagonalize against outputs a vector
whose winner set is the same as that given by 1⌊m/2⌋+10⌊m/2⌋+1 then we will output the
vector 1⌊m/2⌋0⌊m/2⌋+2 and otherwise we will output the vector 1⌊m/2⌋+10⌊m/2⌋+1. To do this,
we immediately write onto our output tape the vector 1⌊m/2⌋+10⌊m/2⌋+1. We do so so that
if we run out of time in our diagonalization on this input, we at least have one of the two
legal vectors that keep our rule pure within our framework. And we do have time to write
this vector, thanks to the (∀m)[T2(m) ≥ k(m+ 1)] assumption of Theorem X.
Now, as to the diagonalization, it goes as follows. If m ≥ 1 is even, then strip away the
leading 1 of m in binary and the trailing 0 of m in binary, and call the string that remains
w. (We strip the trailing 0 because we diagonalize only at even m, but we want the entire
set of such strings created to exactly equal {0, 1}∗.) We will view w as the encoding of a
Turing machine from our enumeration of function-computing TMs. We’ll run it (unless we
run out of time: as per the entire HU framework, we’ll be using a separate tape and the
fully time-constructible nature of T2 to enforce a time cutoff; actually, we’ll use two separate
tapes, since our time cutoff is max(T2(m), k(m+1))) on input 0
m to get the length-m vector
it outputs, call it v (if it halts and has the wrong length output, then it clearly isn’t even
a valid GSR). We must then efficiently evaluate whether that vector has the same winner
set as would 1⌊m/2⌋+10⌊m/2⌋+1. One might think to do so we would have to normalize v,
which includes gcd’s and other time-eating computations, but that is not so. To tell if v
has the same winner set as 1⌊m/2⌋+10⌊m/2⌋+1, we need only test whether v is of the form
a⌊m/2⌋+1b⌊m/2⌋+1, where a and b are members of Z and a > b. If so they have the same
winner set, and if not they don’t. Ignoring for the moment the cost of getting v, this test
is an easy linear-time test on a multihead, multitape TM. If we find that v does have the
same winner set as 1⌊m/2⌋+10⌊m/2⌋+1, then we on our output tape just overwrite the ⌊m/2⌋th
character, changing it from a 1 to a 0 (for example, if m = 4, we’d overwrite the second bit
to change our placeholder 1100 into 1000). So, if we have time for our simulation of w to
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complete and to evaluate whether the v has the same winner set as 1⌊m/2⌋+10⌊m/2⌋+1, and
if it is, have time to overwrite the one bit, then we have successfully diagonalized against
the machine w.
On the other hand, what if we run out of time? No problem. If the machine associated
with w happens to run in time T1(m) for all m (and we’re doing all w, so some will have
that time behavior and some won’t), then—since w will appear infinitely often again in our
construction, as it will also appear as 1w, as 11w, and so on—due to the limsup assumption
we eventually will have the time to fully run the diagonalization (the simulation and our
on-the-cheap comparison of winner sets and our bit-fixing). The reason is that the log
multiplicative overhead in the limsup is (see HU) enough to do the machine simulation,
and the limsup ensures that for any constant c our T2 for every m beyond some point will
satisfy T2(m) > cT1(m) log T1(m).
3
Let us discuss the constant k. k is simply there because for small values of m, we may
not have enough time to see the input, and write the appropriate starting string to our
output tape. (All we know is we have at least m+1 steps. That isn’t enough, as out input
is of the form 0m so until we hit the right-end marker, all we see is 0s, but the starting string
we need to put on the output tape as a placeholder is roughly half 1’s and half 0’s, so if we
just get m + 1 steps, we don’t know roughly halfway through the 0’s that we are roughly
halfway through and that we have to switch from outputting 1’s to outputting 0’s. The
fact that asymptotically we have at least T1(m) log T1(m) time, and thus at least m logm
time, doesn’t help us for small values of m, since if we run out of placeholder time at even
one value of m we’ve violated purity of our alleged PSR.) However, we can set a value of k
that allows us to do the placeholder writing (and on any natural TM framework, it will be
a very small constant k; go to the end of the string 0m, see if it is even, and then output the
right placeholder string, for example by having on an extra dummy tape basically build a
string of just under m/2 1’s that we can use to trigger our switch-over point as we write the
placeholder output), for even small values. Note that k depends just on the TM framework,
not on T1 or T2.
All that remains is how to move from our proof of Theorem X to a proof of Theorem 3.1.
3Readers familiar with the time hierarchy theorem may wonder why we here use a limsup but the HU
theorem uses a liminf. The reason is subtle. Briefly put, in HU, once a machine w is being diagonalized
against at some length, it will be (in its sibling forms 1w, 11w, etc.) diagonalized against at every greater
length. So a liminf suffices, as liminf ensures that at some (indeed, infinitely many, though they don’t really
need that) greater lengths we get enough time overhead to diagonalize, and that is all HU needs. (Warning:
The HU proof itself sets up the right machinery and construction for liminf to suffice, but then inside its
proofs, seems to forget this and by such phrases as “infinitely often” on its p. 298 line 8 and “has arbitrarily
long encodings” on page 298 and 299, say things that would require limsup to support. However, the HU
construction supports liminf, and one can change the two mentioned phrases to “almost everywhere” and
“at every length onward once it first occurs” and the thus adjusted proof becomes correct.) In contrast,
PSRs take as input 0m, and so at each length are diagonalizing against just one Turing machine. And so
we do know that once we face off against w (say, on input 0(1w)binary ), we’ll infinitely often see its identical
siblings at longer lengths (such as on input 0(11w)binary , but note that that is about twice as long, not one
longer), but we don’t know we’ll have them at every length. Basically, since our input is 0m, we get to
attempt just one diagonalization at each length. Happily, under a limsup assumption, we’re safe and fine,
since at every sufficiently long length, we have the headroom to diagonalize.
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The previous paragraph’s contortions will actually already hint to the reader the path
to doing this. Namely, suppose we now must operate without the crutch of having
(∀m)[T2(m) ≥ k(m + 1)]. Our salvation is the limsup claim, which ensures that even-
tually, T2 becomes very big. So all we need to do is find a way to mark time until that
kicks in, and by marking time, we have to make do with m+1 steps as that is all we know
we always have. We can’t such marking time within the framework of the particular PSR
we’ve been using above, because as noted above, one would seem to have to be able to
know the midpoint of 0m in real time as one was passing it, and that is impossible. The
workaround is as follows. We change the PSR that we’ll use. In particular, for each T1
and T2, there exists some odd value m
′ beyond which the limsup ensures that we do have
easily enough time headroom. So what we’ll do is our PSR will simply be 0m at each length
m ≤ m′ (note that we can do this in time m + 1, at length m), and from then on, it will
mimic our trick except with those extra 0’s, namely, we will fixing our vector at each odd
length, m > m′, to be 1⌊(m−m
′)/2⌋0⌊(m−m
′)/2⌋+1+m′ , and at even lengths m > m′, our vector
will be either 1⌊(m−m
′)/2⌋+10⌊(m−m
′)/2⌋+1+m′ or 1⌊(m−m
′)/2⌋0⌊(m−m
′)/2⌋+2+m′ . This allows
us to remove the requirement that (∀m)[T2(m) ≥ k(m + 1)], and so we have established
Theorem 3.1. Note that m′ will depend on T1 and T2, but that is perfectly legal; it does
not undermine the proof.
We finish with some brief, technical comments about possible extensions and alternate
proofs. First, our diagonalization is carried out the world that it is in, namely, the world of
functions. We mention in passing that since the PSR we build is variable only as to which
of two possible vectors it has at each even length, the information behind its choice is in
effect a set—indeed, a set of the form A ⊆ (11)∗, and so a particular type of tally set. One
could use this to make the proof more set-focused. But one would still have to account
for overhead time and so on, and we feel it is more natural to simply have the proof be
in the world the items in question are inhabiting. Second, we mention that it is possible
that one could turn Theorem 3.1’s limsup into a liminf, thus making the theorem stronger.
However, for most natural time functions T1 and T2, the liminf and the limsup are equal,
and so we do not consider this an important direction, especially as it would likely make
the proof far more complex if attempted. We do mention that the natural path to use to
attempt such an improvement would be, once one first was trying to diagonalize against a
given machine, to attempt diagonalizing against that machine at every length from then
on until one had successfully diagonalized against it. But we warn that to even know what
one was currently trying to diagonalize against would require recomputing one’s history,
which itself takes time and can interfere with the proof. Worse, our current setup doesn’t
do any diagonalizations at even lengths, but the liminf could go to zero just due to even
lengths, and that would not at all help us ever have time to diagonalize; so our entire zigzag
framework becomes poisonous, yet abandoning it loses its advantage (already lost anyway
in the type of new construction we are speculating about) of avoiding history rebuilding.
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.2
In the following theorem, nonuniform simply means that the corresponding generators are
not required to be computable in any specific complexity class. In fact, the generators may
be uncomputable.
Theorem 3.2. Q≥0-PSR 6⊆ nonuniform-Z-PSR, Z-PSR 6⊆ nonuniform-Q≥0-
PSR, and Q-PSR 6⊆ nonuniform-Q≥0-PSR ∪ nonuniform-Z-PSR.
Proof. Let us first show that Q≥0-PSR 6⊆ nonuniform-Z-PSR. Consider the following
FP-uniform Q≥0-PSR generator f .
f(01) = (1),
f(02) = (32 , 1),
f(03) = (32 , 1,
1
2),
f(04) = (74 ,
3
2 , 1,
1
2),
f(05) = (74 ,
3
2 , 1,
1
2 ,
1
4),
f(06) = (158 ,
7
4 ,
3
2 , 1,
1
2 ,
1
4),
f(07) = (158 ,
7
4 ,
3
2 , 1,
1
2 ,
1
4 ,
1
8),
etc.
Consider a nonuniform Z-PSR type generator g that claims to have the same winner
set as this on all instances. By the (clear) extension of Proposition 2.1 mentioned at the
end of the paragraph that follows that result, the 5-candidate vector of g must normalize to
(6, 5, 3, 1, 0). The ordered gap pattern in this is: 1,2,2,1. So the actual 5-candidate vector
(over Z) of g satisfies 2(α51 − α
5
2) = (α
5
2 − α
5
3) = (α
5
3 − α
5
4) = 2(α
5
4 − α
5
5). Similarly, the 7-
candidate vector of g must normalize to a vector having gap pattern: 1,2,4,4,2,1. Since that
vector retains all 5 coefficients from the 5-candidate vector, with two additional coefficients
appropriately added, by inspection of the possibilities, it is clear that the only possible
extension that achieves this is one that adds exactly the coefficients α51 +
1
2 (α
5
1 − α
5
2) and
α55 −
1
2 (α
5
1 − α
5
2) (and due to the 6-candidate vector, they must be added in the order just
stated). That is, the vector extends to the right and left, but an amount half the “base”
gap. However, note that if α51−α
5
2 is not a multiple of 2, this extension is already not legal
over Z, as it would have coefficients not in Z. If α51 − α
5
2 is a multiple of 2, then we indeed
do have this valid extension of the 5-candidate vector. But by the same argument, the only
possible 9-candidate vector again will have to be formed from the 7-candidate vector by
extending to the right and left ends by half the then-current “base” gap. Note that that
will not be possible unless α51 − α
5
2 is a multiple of 2
2 = 4. And so on. Since there is some
power of 2 that is the maximum power of two that divides α51−α
5
2, this process will eventual
end in failure, i.e., there will be no valid vector over Z that properly extends the pattern g
has trapped itself into. Thus, contrary to the claim made for g, g in fact cannot match the
winner sets of f .
Let us now show that Z-PSR 6⊆ nonuniform-Q′-PSR. We will give the argument
for this case more compactly, since the reader by now will be familiar with the flavor of
arguments of this sort, from the above case. Consider the following FP-uniform Z-PSR
generator f .
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f(01) = (0),
f(02) = (1, 0),
f(03) = (1, 0,−1),
f(04) = (2, 1, 0,−1),
f(05) = (2, 1, 0,−1,−2),
f(06) = (4, 2, 1, 0,−1,−2),
f(07) = (4, 2, 1, 0,−1,−2,−4),
etc.
Consider a nonuniform Q≥0-PSR type generator g that claims to have the same winner
set as this on all instances. Note that the gap pattern, at each length starting at 5, is that
we have four identical, adjacent smallest-size (among the gaps that exist) gaps in the center,
and then surrounding that the gaps grow by repeatedly doubling (with the extra one being
on the “upper” side on even-length cases). Note that no single internal insertion anywhere
maintains a four, identical, adjacent, smallest-size (among the gaps that exist) gap pattern.
So we can only expand by going doubly-far to the right and left in each pair of extensions.
But that means the values α2m+12m+1 will be decreasing at an exponentially increasing rate.
And so since α11 was finite, at some m the value α
2m+1
2m+1 will necessarily have to be less than
zero, and so will not be an element of Q≥0.
We’ll sketch Q-PSR 6⊆ nonuniform-Q≥0-PSR ∪ nonuniform-Z-PSR even more
briefly. It does not automatically follow from the earlier parts; claiming that would be like
claiming that since not all integers are even and not all integers are odd, it follows that not
all integers are odd integers or even integers. Nonetheless, by building a construction that
uses both of the weaknesses exploited by the constructions of the preceding two parts, we
can easily establish that Q-PSR 6⊆ nonuniform-Q≥0-PSR ∪ nonuniform-Z-PSR. In
particular, it is easy to prove that the following FP-uniform Q-PSR has the desired property.
After setting down 4 equally spaced gaps, it in term makes re-doublingly large gaps going
in the negative direction and re-halvingly large gaps going in the positive direction.
f(01) = (2),
f(02) = (2, 1),
f(03) = (2, 1, 0),
f(04) = (2, 1, 0,−1),
f(05) = (2, 1, 0,−1,−2),
f(06) = (2, 1, 0,−1,−2,−4),
f(07) = (212 , 2, 1, 0,−1,−2,−4),
f(08) = (212 , 2, 1, 0,−1,−2,−4,−8),
f(09) = (234 , 2
1
2 , 2, 1, 0,−1,−2,−4,−8),
f(010) = (234 , 2
1
2 , 2, 1, 0,−1,−2,−4,−8,−16),
f(011) = (278 , 2
3
4 , 2
1
2 , 2, 1, 0,−1,−2,−4,−8),
etc.
By using the natural variants for this of both types of arguments used in the earlier
parts of this proof, we can argue that this function can be accepted by neither a Q≥0-type
generator nor a Z-type generator.
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Theorem 3.3. N-FPSR = Q-FPSR = Q≥0-FPSR = Z-FPSR = Q-PSR.
Proof. Theorem 3.3 is immediately clear, in light of Proposition 2.1 and the end of the
paragraph following it, since our normalizations shifted each of these types to equivalent
vectors over N, which is the most restrictive of all these types.
The equality with Q-PSR can easily be seen by inductively constructing, for every
flexible generator f , an equivalent pure generator over the rationals.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Theorem 3.4. There is an FP-uniform PSR that is not generated even by any nonuniform
PSRnorm-0 generator. On the other hand, every FP-uniform (respectively, nonuniform) PSR
is generated by a FP-uniform (respectively, nonuniform) PSR generator that for all but a
finite number of m has the property that the last coefficient, αm,m, is zero and the gcd of
the nonzero coefficients in the length-m vector is one.
Proof. Let us prove the first part of the theorem. Consider this FP-uniform N-PSR, which
we mention in passing is even an FP-uniform N-PSRnorm-gcd. f(0
1) = (5), f(02) = (6, 5),
f(03) = (7, 6, 5), f(04) = (8, 7, 6, 5), and f(05) = (8, 7, 6, 5, 0). We won’t use longer lengths
here, but to make clear that this is a pure scoring rule, let us say that the remaining lengths
are f(06) = (8, 7, 6, 5, 0, 0), f(07) = (8, 7, 6, 5, 0, 0, 0), and so on.
Consider an N-PSRnorm-0 type generator g
′ that claims to have the same winner set as
this on all instances. So by Proposition 2.1, it is clear that the 4-candidate vector of g′ must
be of the form (3k, 2k, k, 0), for some k ∈ N− {0}.
But clearly addition of one coefficient to this vector cannot yield anything that normal-
izes to (8, 7, 6, 5, 0); one can see this easily by examining each of the legal insertion places
and seeing that it cannot suffice. So the rule of g′ differs from the original rule on some
5-candidate examples, by Proposition 2.1.
(We mention in passing that the exact same f we just used can also be easily argued to
be accepted by no PSR generator that has the property that at each length, the gcd of its
nonzero coefficients (if any) is one.)
Let us turn to the second claim of the theorem, namely, that every N-PSR is generated
by an N-PSR generator that on all but at most a finite number of lengthsm has the property
that the last coefficient is zero and the gcd of the nonzero coefficients in the length-m vector
is one.
Given E1, an FP-uniform N -PSR, fix an FP generator for that rule. Let Pool = {α
m
j |
m ≥ 1 ∧ 1 ≤ j ≤ m}, i.e., it is the set of all coefficients.
If ‖Pool‖ = 1 we are done easily using the scoring vector sequence (0), (0, 0), (0, 0, 0),
. . . .
So henceforth we assume that ‖Pool‖ ≥ 2. Let min(Pool ) = k. Now, alter the generator
from now on (and thus each αij, and so indirectly we also have altered Pool ) to subtract k
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from each original αij . So it is clear that, after the alteration, at all but a finite number of
values of m we have αmm = 0.
Let j = gcd(Pool ), for the (altered) Pool .
Let us keep in mind that with PSRs, coefficients that occur at a length must also occur at
each greater length. If j = 1, then there is some finite length at which the set of coefficients
at that length has a gcd of one, and so at all greater lengths the coefficient set also has a
gcd of one. If j ≥ 2, then further re-alter our generator to, after subtracting k, divide by j.
Applying the j = 1 argument to this, we again have that the gcd will be one at all but a
finite number of lengths, and as dividing by j does not change the set of lengths at which
αmm = 0, we also have that for our re-altered generator α
m
m is zero for all but a finite number
of m’s. The re-altered generator is clearly polynomial-time computable if the original one
is, so we have completed the proof of the theorem’s second part for the FP-uniform case,
and the result clearly also holds for the nonuniform case, by the same argument with the
discussion of runtimes removed.
B Omitted Proofs and Discussion from Section 4
B.1 Missing Pieces of the Proof of Theorem 4.4
Here we present the proofs of the two facts used in the proof of Theorem 4.4. We start with
Fact 1:
Fact 1. For i ∈ {1, 2}, given a set S ⊆ V1∪V2, it can be checked in polynomial time whether
S can be extended, by adding at most k − ‖S‖ voters from Vi to make p win.
Proof. For each candidate c ∈ C, let sc be the score of that candidate after the voters in
V and the voters in R have been counted. For the remainder of the proof of Fact 1, we
assume that i = 1, i.e., we are adding voters with p in the first position. Since the proof of
Fact 1 does not use the fact that α ≥ β, the proof works in the same way for i = 2, i.e.,
adding voters voting p in the second position.
We can add at most r = k − ‖S‖ voters from V1. Clearly, k is bound by the size of the
instance. Thus we can brute-force over every j ∈ {0, . . . , r} and check whether S can be
extended with exactly j voters from V1. To do this for a given j, we proceed as follows:
• First, we compute the number of points that p will have after adding j voters from V1,
this is sp + jα. We denote this number with s
final
p .
• For each candidate c ∈ C, we compute the maximal number mc of votes giving points to
c that can be added. This is the maximal number mc with sc +mcβ ≤ s
final
p . If mc is
negative for some c, then S cannot be extended with exactly j voters from V1.
• For each candidate c ∈ C, we add voters voting c in the second place while still possible,
i.e., while all of the following hold:
– the number of added voters up to now does not exceed j,
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– the number of added voters voting c second does not exceed mc,
– there are still voters available voting c second.
• If the resulting set is a solution to the control problem, accept. Otherwise, S cannot be
extended with exactly j voters from V1.
The proof for Fact 2 follows:
Fact 2. To make p win, it is never better to add ℓ voters from V2 than adding ℓ pairwise
different voters from V1.
Proof. Let S1 (S2) be the corresponding subset of V1 (V2). Let c1, . . . , cℓ be the candidates
voted in the second place by the voters in S1. We compare the effect that adding S1 or S2
has on the relationship between p and the ci (clearly, for the relationship between p and
candidates c /∈ {c1, . . . , cℓ}, adding S1 is always better).
• When adding S1, p gains (ℓ− 1)α+ (α− β) = ℓα− β points against each ci.
• When adding S2, p gains at most ℓβ points against each of the ci.
Since ℓ(α − β) ≥ β, we have that ℓα − β ≥ ℓβ, and so adding S1 is at least as good as
adding S2.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 4.7
The proof Lemma 4.7 makes extensive use of the following construction:
Lemma B.1. Given a scoring vector (α1, . . . , αm) , and numbers i 6= j, k 6= l ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
there is a set V of m votes such that when counting the votes in V , the scores of all candidates
is A :=
∑n
m=1 αm, except:
• candidate ci has A+ αk − αl points,
• candidate cj has A+ αl − αk points.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume i ≤ j and k ≤ l, otherwise we swap.
Let v1 be a vote having ci in position l and cj in position k, the remaining candidates
are ordered arbitrarily. For any ℓ ≥ 1, let vℓ+1 be the vote obtained from vℓ by moving each
candidate one position to the right, i.e., the candidate at position t in the vote vℓ ends at
position t + 1 in the vote vℓ+1 if t + 1 ≤ m, and at position 1 if t + 1 = m. Now let V0
contain the votes v1, . . . , vm. Clearly, each candidate gains exactly A points in the votes V0.
Now, let V be obtained from V0 by exchanging, in the vote v0, the positions of candidate
ci and cj. Then, relatively to the votes V0, the points of ci and cj change as follows:
• ci loses αl points and gains αk points,
• cj loses αk points and gains αl points.
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So the relative score is as required.
The actual proof of Lemma 4.7 follows:
Lemma 4.7. Given a scoring vector (α1, . . . , αm), and for each c ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1}, numbers
ac1, . . . , a
c
m in signed unary, and a number k in unary, we can compute, in polynomial
time, votes such that the scores of the candidates when evaluating these votes according
to the scoring vector (α1, . . . , αm) are as follows: There is some o such that for each c ∈
{1, . . . ,m− 1}, score(c) = o+
∑m
i=1 a
c
iαi, and score(c) > score(m) + kα1.
Proof. The algorithm produces the set V by consecutive applications of Lemma B.1. We
say that an application of the Lemma transfers (αk − αl) points from cj to ci, since the
relative score (in relation to all candidates except ci and cj) of ci increases by αk−αl, while
the score of cj decreases by the same amount. Note that in order for such a “transfer” to be
possible, neither candidate is required to actually have a nonzero score. We start with the
empty set V , and then, for each aci 6= 0 for some c ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}, we proceed as follows:
• if aci > 0, we apply Lemma B.1 a
c
i times to transfer αi points from the candidate m to
the candidate c,
• if aci < 0, we apply Lemma B.1 (m− 2)a
c
i times to transfer αi points from the candidate
m to each candidate c′ 6= {c,m}.
In the above steps, clearly the score of m is the lowest among all candidates. So to ensure
that score(i) > score(m) + kα1, it suffices to transfer (k + 1)α1 points from the candidate
m to each candidate c ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}. Clearly, the resulting scores are as required.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 4.9 and Discussion of “Partial Reductions”
In the discussion surrounding Theorems 4.8 and 4.10, we described Theorem 4.8 and its
“dual”—which we now state formallyas Theorem B.2—as “partial reductions.” To clar-
ify this unusual terminology, we now explain why we use this term. For a generator f
that is covered in Theorem 4.10, it is not necessarily the case that hardness follows from
Theorem 4.8 alone (or from Theorem B.2 alone). Rather, for each value of m result-
ing from a 3DM-instance, the reduction establishing NP-hardness (which is given in the
proof of Theorem 4.10) needs to check which of the two cases (as to meeting the differing
“α... < α...” conditions listed in Theorem 4.8 and Theorem B.2) is satisfied. Depending on
which condition applies, either the reduction g from Theorem 4.8 or the reduction g from
Theorem B.2 is used for this particular 3DM-instance. In this sense, Theorem 4.8 (and also
its “dual,” Theorem B.2) are “partial” reductions: For a given f , each of these theorems may
only be “half” of the reduction needed to prove the NP-hardness of f -CCAV. Theorems 4.8
and B.2 together, with a simple additional observation, then give Theorem 4.10, which is
the “complete” reduction to obtain NP-completeness of f -CCAV.
Let us turn from the above discussion to the formal statement of Theorem 4.9 and its
proof: We recall the statement of the Theorem:
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Theorem 4.9. Theorem 4.8 also holds when the condition αf,mk+1 > α
f,m
m−2 is replaced with
αf,m4 > α
f,m
m−3k+1.
The complete statement of Theorem 4.9 is as follows. Note that again, we do not require
the generator f to respect any purity conditions.
Theorem B.2. Let f be an FP-uniform Q-generator. Then there exists an FP-computable
function g such that
• g takes as input an instance I3DM of 3DM where k = ‖X‖ = ‖Y ‖ = ‖Z‖,
• g produces an instance ICCAV of f -CCAV,
• If for m = 6k we have that αf,m4 > α
f,m
m−3k+1, then: I3DM is a positive instance of 3DM if
and only if ICCAV is a positive instance of f -CCAV.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 4.8 above, in particular we use
the same set of candidates. Again, let M ⊆ X × Y × Z be the set from I3DM, and let
X = {s1, . . . , sk}, Y = {sk+1, . . . , s2k}, Z = {s2k+1, . . . , s3k}. Similarly to the proof of
theorem 4.8, we use Lemma 4.7 to construct an election with relative points as follows:
• score(p) = 0,
• for each i ∈ {1, . . . , 3k}, score(si) = kα1 − (k − 1)αm−3k+i − α1+r(i),
• all dummy candidates have points such that adding at most k votes does not let them
win the election.
For each (x, y, z) = (sh, si, sj) ∈ M with h < i < j, we add an available voter vot-
ing as follows: p > x > y > z > d4 > · · · > dm−3k−1 > s1 > · · · > sh−1 > d1 >
sh+1 > · · · > si−1 > d2 > si+1 > · · · > sj−1 > d3 > sj+1 > . . . , s3k.
We say that x, y, and z are approved in this vote. Note that a candidate si gets α1+r(i)
(where r(i) = 1, 2 or 3 depending whether si ∈ X, Y or Z) points in a vote approving si,
and gets αm−3k+i in a vote not approving si.
We claim that p can be made a winner by adding at most k of the available votes if and
only if the 3DM instance is positive.
First assume that the 3DM instance is positive, and let C ⊆M be a cover with ‖C‖ = k.
We add the votes corresponding to the elements of C, i.e., for each candidate si, we add
one vote that approves si and (k − 1) votes that do not approve si. The final score of the
nondummy candidates is as follows:
• Candidate p gains α1 points in each of the k added votes, so the final score of p is kα1,
• each candidate si gains α1+r(i) + (k − 1)αm−3k+i points from the one vote approving si
and the k− 1 votes not approving si. Thus the final score of si is kα1− (k− 1)αm−3k+i−
α1+r(i) + α1+r(i) + (k − 1)αm−3k+i = kα1.
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Thus p and si tie, and so p is a winner of the election.
For the converse, assume that p can be made a winner by adding at most k voters. Let
C be the elements of M corresponding to the added votes, then ‖C‖ ≤ k.
Since α1 ≥ α4 > αm−3k+1, we know that the score of s1 before adding any votes is
positive. Thus C 6= ∅, i.e., at least one vote is added. Let z be a candidate from Z who is
approved in at least one of the added votes. We show that ‖C‖ = k. For this, indirectly
assume that ‖C‖ < k. We show that z strictly beats p in this case: Consider the final
scores of p and z. Let i be the index of z, i.e., the i with si = z. Note that r(i) = 3, since
si = z ∈ Z.
• candidate p gains ‖C‖α1 points,
• candidate z gains at least α4 + (‖C‖ − 1)αm−3k+i points (even more if z is approved in
more than one of the additional votes). Thus the final score of z is at least
kα1 − (k − 1)αm−3k+i − α4 + α4 + (‖C‖ − 1)αm−3k+i = kα1 + (‖C‖ − k)αm−3k+i
To see that z strictly beats p, we compute the difference between their scores, which is
kα1 + (‖C‖ − k)αm−3k+i︸ ︷︷ ︸
score(si)
− ‖C‖α1︸ ︷︷ ︸
score(p)
= (k − ‖C‖)α1 − (k − ‖C‖)αm−3k+i
= (k − ‖C‖)(α1 − αm−3k+i).
Since, by assumption, k − ‖C‖ > 0, and α1 ≥ α4 > αm−3k+1 ≥ αm−3k+i, this difference
is positive and so si strictly beats p if ‖C‖ < k. Thus we know that ‖C‖ = k.
We now show that C is indeed a cover. Assume that this is not the case, so, since
‖C‖ = k, without loss of generality, there is some z′ ∈ Z which is covered twice, i.e., which
is approved in at least two of the added votes. We show that this z′ strictly beats p in the
election after the addition of votes by comparing the score of p and z′. As above, let i be
the index of z′, i.e., chose i such that z′ = si. The scores are as follows (again, r(i) = 3
since si ∈ Z):
• The candidate p again gets kα1 points, and so its final score is kα1.
• The candidate z′ is approved in at least 2 of the k additional votes. Thus z′ gains at least
2α4 + (k − 2)αm−3k+i points. The final score of z
′ is thus at least
kα1 − (k − 1)αm−3k+i − α1+r(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=α4
+2α4 + (k − 2)αm−3k+i = kα1 − αm−3k+i + α4.
Since α4 > αm−3k+1 ≥ αm−3k+i, it follows that the final score of z
′ exceeds the score of
p, and so z′ indeed strictly beats p as claimed if C is not a cover. Thus C is indeed a cover
as required.
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B.4 Proof of Theorem 4.10
Theorem 4.10. f -CCAV is NP-complete for every FP-uniform pure Q-generator f with
αf,m4 > α
f,m
m−2 for some m.
Proof. Clearly, for pure scoring rules, if the condition αf,m4 > α
f,m
m−2 is true for some m, then
it remains true for all m′ ≥ m, since it is easy to see that αf,m+14 ≥ α
f,m
4 and α
f,m+1
m+1−2 ≤
αf,mm−2.
We prove NP-hardness by a reduction from 3DM. So let I3DM be a 3DM-instance, and
let k be the cardinality of the set X in I3DM. Without loss of generality, we can assume
that k is large enough such that the number m = 6k satisfies the condition αf,m4 > α
f,m
m−2.
Due to the monotonicity of the coefficients and since m− 3k + 1 = 3k + 1, we have that
αf,m4 ≥ α
f,m
m−3k+1 = α
f,m
3k+1 ≥ α
f,m
m−2,
and since αf,m4 > α
f,m
m−2, we know that one of the cases α
f,m
3k+1 > α
f,m
m−2, or α
f,m
4 > α
f,m
m−3k+1
occurs. In the first case, we use the reduction from Theorem 4.8, in the second case, the
one from Theorem B.2.
B.5 Proof of Theorem 4.12.1
Theorem 4.12. The problem f -CCAV is NP-complete if f is one of the following pure
generators:
1. f = (α1, α2, α3, α4, . . . , α4, α5, 0) with α2 > α4 > 0.
2. f = (α1, α2, . . . , α2, 0) with α1 /∈ {α2, 2α2}, α2 > 0.
3. f = (α1, α2, . . . , α2, α5, 0) with α1 > α2 > α5.
4. f = (α1, . . . , α1, α5, 0) with α1 > α5 > 0.
Proof. Again, we reduce from 3DM. Let n = ‖M‖, and let k = ‖X‖ = ‖Y ‖ = ‖Z‖. We
introduce the following candidates:
• The preferred candidate p,
• for each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z a candidate c,
• two dummy candidates d1 and d2.
Using Lemma 4.7, we construct the registered voters such that the relative score of the
candidates before adding voters is as follows:
• score(p) = −kα4,
• score(d1), score(d2) < −k(α1 + α4),
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• score(x) = −α1 − (k − 1)α4 for each x ∈ X,
• score(y) = −α2 − (k − 1)α4 for each y ∈ Y ,
• score(z) = −(k − 1)α4 for each z ∈ Z.
For each (x, y, z) ∈M , we add one available voter voting
x︸︷︷︸
α1
> y︸︷︷︸
α2
> d1︸︷︷︸
α3
> p > . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
α4
> d2︸︷︷︸
α5
> z︸︷︷︸
0
.
We claim that p can be made a winner by adding at most k voters if and only if there
is a cover C ⊆M with ‖I‖ = k.
First, assume that there is such a cover C. Then, adding the voters corresponding to
the elements of C changes the scores as follows:
• p gains kα4 points and thus ends up with 0 points,
• each x (y) gains α1 + (k − 1)α4 points (α2 + (k − 1)α4 points), which leads to 0 points,
• each z gains (k − 1)α4 points, also finishing with 0 points,
• by construction, d1 and d2 cannot win the election.
For the other direction, assume that C is a set of added voters that makes p win the
election with ‖C‖ ≤ k. Since α4 > 0, we know that p must gain one point against every
candidate z ∈ Z, and can gain against one of these candidates for each added vote, at least
‖Z‖ = k votes must be added, so ‖C‖ = k. We prove that C is a cover. By the above, C
covers Z. Indirectly assume that there is some x (y) that is voted in the first (second) place
in more than one of the voters from C. In this case, x (y) gains at least 2α1 + (k − 2)α4
(2α2+ (k− 2)α4) points, and so ends up with −α1− (k− 1)α4+2α1+(k− 2)α4 = α1−α4
points (α2 − α4 points). Since α1 ≥ α2 > α4, p does not win the election in this case, a
contradiction. This completes the proof.
B.6 Proof of Theorem 4.12.2
Theorem 4.12. The problem f -CCAV is NP-complete if f is one of the following pure
generators:
1. f = (α1, α2, α3, α4, . . . , α4, α5, 0) with α2 > α4 > 0.
2. f = (α1, α2, . . . , α2, 0) with α1 /∈ {α2, 2α2}, α2 > 0.
3. f = (α1, α2, . . . , α2, α5, 0) with α1 > α2 > α5.
4. f = (α1, . . . , α1, α5, 0) with α1 > α5 > 0.
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The proof of this theorem uses two different reductions depending on which of the cases
α1 > 2α2 or α1 < 2α applies. We start with the case α1 > 2α2:
Theorem B.3. f -CCAV is NP-complete for the generator f = (α1, α2, . . . , α2, 0) with
α1 > 2α2 > 0.
Proof. We again reduce from 3DM. So let k = ‖X‖ = ‖Y ‖ = ‖Z‖. We introduce the
following candidates:
• the preferred candidate p,
• a candidate c for each c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z,
• for each Si ∈M , a candidate Si,
• a dummy candidate d (used for the application of Lemma 4.7).
Without loss of generality, due to Proposition 2.1, we can assume that for the relevant
length, gcdα1, α2 = 1, and α1, α2 ∈ N. In particular, the number 1 can be obtained as a
linear combination of α1 and α2. We thus can apply Lemma 4.7 to construct a set of voters
V such that the relative scores are as follows:
• score(p) = 0,
• score(y) = α2 for each y ∈ Y ,
• score(x) = score(z) = α2 − α1 for each x ∈ X and z ∈ Z,
• score(Si) = 2α2 − α1 + 1 for each Si ∈M ,
• score(d) < −3kα1.
For each Si = (xi, yi, zi) ∈M , we add the following available voters:
• Si > · · · > yi,
• zi > · · · > Si,
• xi > · · · > Si.
We say that a vote vetoes the candidate it places in the last position. We claim that
p can be made a winner of the election with adding at most 3k votes if and only if the
3DM-instance is positive. By construction, the dummy candidate d cannot win the election
by adding at most 3k votes, so we ignore d in the sequel.
Note that since p is voted in one of the middle positions in all of the potentially added
voters, the score of p only depends on the number of added voters, and not on the concrete
choice of added votes. We thus consider only the change of relative scores between the
candidates and p when studying the effect of added voters.
First assume that there is a cover C with ‖C‖ = k. For all Si ∈ C, we add all votes
voting Si in the first or in the last position. Then the scores (relatively to p) change as
follows:
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• each yi is vetoed once, and so loses α2 points relative to p, so has final score 0,
• each Si with i ∈ I appears once in the first position and twice in the last position, so Si
gains α1 −α2 − 2α2 = α1 − 3α2 points. So the final score of such an Si is 2α2 −α1 +1+
α1 − 3α2 = −α2 + 1 ≤ 0, since α2 ≥ 1.
• for each Si with i /∈ I, the relative points of Si and p do not change. Since α1 > 2α2 and
α1, α2 ∈ N, it follows that 2α2 − α1 + 1 ≤ 0 and so Si does not beat p.
• each zi and each xi gain exactly α1 − α2 points against p, and so tie with p.
Thus p wins the election after adding these voters.
For the converse, assume that there is a set V of available voters that we can add with
‖V ‖ ≤ 3k such that p wins the resulting election. Since each y ∈ Y is currently winning
against p, and the only way for y to lose points relatively to p is adding the vote voting y
last, we know that for each y ∈ Y , there is one vote in V that votes y last. In particular,
we have ‖V ‖ ≥ k. So there are votes v1, . . . , vk ∈ V , each voting a different y in the last
position, and thus each voting a different Si in the first position.
For each such vote, one of the Si gains (α1−α2) points against p. If such an Si is vetoed
only once, then its final score is 2α2−α1+1+α1−α2−α2 = 1, and so p does not win the
election. Thus each Si gaining points in one of the votes v1, . . . , vk must be vetoed at least
twice. Since ‖V ‖ ≤ 3k, we know that ‖V ‖ = 3k. Let I = {i | Si > · · · > yi ∈ V }. We claim
that I is a cover. By the above, I covers each y ∈ Y . Now assume that for i 6= j ∈ I, we
have xi = xj . Then xi gains 2(α1−α2) points against p, and so p does not win the election,
since α1 > α2. The same argument holds for y. Thus, due to cardinality, we have a cover
of X, Y , and Z.
The case α1 < 2α2 is similar:
Theorem B.4. f -CCAV is NP-complete for the generator f = (α1, α2, . . . , α2, 0) with
α1 < 2α2.
Proof. Very similar to the proof of Theorem B.3. We again reduce from 3DM. We use the
same candidate set as in the proof of Theorem B.3 (including the dummy candidate for the
application of Lemma 4.7), and set up the scores of the nondummy candidates as follows:
• score(p) = 0,
• score(y) = α2 − α1 for each y ∈ Y ,
• score(x) = score(z) = α2 for each x ∈ X and each z ∈ Z,
• score(Si) = min(0, 3α2 − 2α1).
For each tuple Si = (xi, yi, zi), we add three available voters
• yi > · · · > Si,
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• Si > · · · > xi,
• Si > · · · > zi.
We say that a vote as above approves (vetoes) the candidate put in its first (last)
position.
If there is a cover with size at most k, we choose the 3 voters associated with each
element of the cover. This lets each x and each z lose α2 points against p, each yi gains
(α1−α2) points against p, and each Si in the cover ends up with score(Si)+2(α1−α2)−α2 =
score(Si) + 2α1 − 3α2 ≤ 3α2 − 2α1 + 2α1 − 3α2 = 0 points (all points counted relative to
p). Thus all candidates tie and p is a winner of the resulting election.
For the converse, assume that p can be made a winner by adding at most 3k voters,
let V be the corresponding set. Clearly, each x ∈ X and each z ∈ Z need to be vetoed
by some vote in V . Thus there are at least 2k votes in V that vote some Si in the first
position. Let C contain all indices Si such that there is a vote in V approving of Si. Clearly,
‖C‖ ≥ k. Then, each Si ∈ C gains at least (α1 − α2) points from these votes, and thus has
min(0, 3α2 − 2α1) + α1 − α2 points. If the minimum is 0, then this clearly is more than 0,
if the minimum is 3α2 − 2α1, then the score adds up to 3α2 − 2α1 + α1 − α2 = 2α2 − 1α1,
which also exceeds 0 since α1 < 2α2. Thus each Si ∈ C must be vetoed at least once.
In particular, there must be at least k votes vetoing some Si, and since due to cardinality
reasons, there can be only k votes vetoing some Si, we know that ‖C‖ ≤ k. Due to the
above, we also know ‖C‖ ≥ k, so ‖C‖ = k.
It remains to show that C covers X, Y , and Z. As argued above, each x and each z
need to be vetoed once, so C covers X and Z. To show that C also covers Y , it suffices to
show that no y can be approved twice. This trivially follows since score(y) = α2 − α1, and
each approval lets y gain α1 − α2 > 0 points against p.
The proof of Theorem 4.12.2 now directly follows from the above results:
Proof. If α1 ≥ α2 > 0 with α1 /∈ {α2, 2α2}, then one of the following cases applies:
• α1 > 2α2 > 0, in this case the result follows from Theorem B.3,
• 2α2 > α1 > α2 > 0, in this case the result follows from Theorem B.4.
B.7 Proof of Theorem 4.12.3
Theorem 4.12. The problem f -CCAV is NP-complete if f is one of the following pure
generators:
1. f = (α1, α2, α3, α4, . . . , α4, α5, 0) with α2 > α4 > 0.
2. f = (α1, α2, . . . , α2, 0) with α1 /∈ {α2, 2α2}, α2 > 0.
3. f = (α1, α2, . . . , α2, α5, 0) with α1 > α2 > α5.
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4. f = (α1, . . . , α1, α5, 0) with α1 > α5 > 0.
Proof. We again reduce from 3DM, let k = ‖X‖ = ‖Y ‖ = ‖Z‖. Using Lemma 4.7, we set
up the the relative scores as follows:
• score(p) = 0,
• score(x) = −(α1 − α2) for each x ∈ X,
• score(y) = α2 − α5 for each y ∈ Y ,
• score(z) = α2 for each z ∈ Z,
• score(d) < −kα1, here d again is a dummy candidate required for the application of
Lemma 4.7, who cannot win the election and whom we ignore in the sequel.
The available voters are as follows: For each (x, y, z) in M , there is an available voter
voting
x > · · · > y > z.
We claim that p can be made a winner of the election if and only if the 3DM-instance is
positive. First assume that the instance is positive, we then add the k votes corresponding
to the cover. Then:
• each x ∈ X gains exactly α1 − α2 points relatively to p,
• each y ∈ Y loses exactly α2 − α5 points relatively to p,
• each z ∈ Z loses exactly α2 points relatively to p.
Thus all candidates tie and p is a winner of the election. For the converse, assume that
p can be made a winner by adding at most k voters, let C be the corresponding subset of
M . Since each y ∈ Y and each z ∈ Z need to lose points relatively to p, C covers each Y
and Z. C cannot cover any x ∈ X twice, since otherwise x would gain 2(α1 − α2) points
and thus beat p in the election. Thus C covers each x at most once, and so covers each x
exactly once, thus C is a cover as required.
B.8 Proof of Theorem 4.12.4
Theorem 4.12. The problem f -CCAV is NP-complete if f is one of the following pure
generators:
1. f = (α1, α2, α3, α4, . . . , α4, α5, 0) with α2 > α4 > 0.
2. f = (α1, α2, . . . , α2, 0) with α1 /∈ {α2, 2α2}, α2 > 0.
3. f = (α1, α2, . . . , α2, α5, 0) with α1 > α2 > α5.
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4. f = (α1, . . . , α1, α5, 0) with α1 > α5 > 0.
Proof. We again reduce from 3DM. Let M be a 3DM-instance with ‖M‖ = n, and let
k = ‖X‖ = ‖Y ‖ = ‖Z‖. In addition to the preferred candidate p, we introduce a candidate
c for each c ∈ X ∪Y ∪Z, and for each Si ∈M , we introduce a candidate Si and a candidate
S′i. We use Lemma 4.7 to set up the registered voters such that, relatively to p, we have
the following scores:
• score(p) = 0,
• score(x) = score(y) = score(z) = α1 for each x ∈ X, y ∈ Y , and z ∈ Z,
• score(Si) = min(α1, 2(α1 − α5)) for each Si ∈M ,
• score(S′i) = α1 − α5 for each Si ∈M ,
• score(d) < −(n+2k)α1, where d again is a dummy candidate needed to apply Lemma 4.7,
whom we ignore from now on.
Note that since α1 > α5 > 0, all of these scores—except for p and d—are strictly
positive. For each Si = (xi, yi, zi) ∈M , we add the following available voters:
• · · · > S′i > Si,
• · · · > Si > xi,
• · · · > Si > yi,
• · · · > S′i > zi.
Again, we say that a vote vetoes its last-places candidate. We claim that p can be made
a winner by adding at most n+2k voters if and only if the 3DM-instance is positive. First
assume that there is a cover C ⊆M with ‖C‖ ≤ k. We add the following voters:
• for each Si = (xi, yi, zi) ∈ C, we add the voters · · · > Si > xi, · · · > Si > yi, and
. . . S′i > zi.
• for each Si /∈ C, we add the voter · · · > S
′
i > Si.
When adding these voters, each candidate c ∈ X ∪ Y ∪ Z loses α1 points against p and
thus ends with 0 points. Each candidate S′i loses α1−α5 points and so also has 0 points in
the end. A candidate Si ∈ C loses 2(α1 − α5) ≥ score(Si) points, and a candidate Si /∈ C
loses α1 ≥ score(Si) points. In both cases, Si has at most 0 points after the election. Thus
p wins the election.
For the converse, assume that there is a set V of voters with ‖V ‖ ≤ n+ 2k such that p
wins the election after the votes in V are added. Without loss of generality, we can assume
‖V ‖ = n + 2k, since none of the available votes hurt p. Let I be the set of indices i such
that a vote of the form · · · > Si > xi, · · · > Si > yi, or · · · > S
′
i > zi is contained in V . We
observe the following:
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• Since each candidate from X, Y , and Z must lose α1 points against p, for each of these
candidates there must be a vote in V voting that candidate last. Thus at least 3k votes
voting one such candidate last must appear in V .
• Without loss of generality, we can assume that exactly 3k votes of the above form appear
in V , since it does not help to veto one of these candidates twice (to stop one of the
candidates Si, S
′
i from winning against p, a vote of the form · · · > S
′
i > Si is always
preferable).
• Thus there are exactly n − k votes of the form · · · > S′i > Si in V . Since one such vote
is enough to lower the relative score of S′i and Si to the score of p and below, we can
without loss of generality assume that these votes are all distinct.
• Let C be the set of indices such that · · · > S′i > Si /∈ V . Due to the above, we know that
I = k.
• For each i ∈ C, since Si must lose more than α1 − α5 points, both voters · · · > Si > xi
and · · · > Si > yi must appear in V .
• For each i ∈ C, since S′i must lose points, the votes · · · > S
′
i > zi must appear in V ,
• Since there are only 3k voters voting a candidate from X ∪ Y ∪ Z last, it follows that C
is a cover.
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